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INTRODUCTION 
The petition for rehearing in this action asserts that 
the Court's decision must be viewed as more than merely a 
"resolution of a conflict between the plaintiffs and defendants 
in the instant case." Petition for Rehearing at pg. 2. While 
the plaintiffs acknowledge that the Court's decision may have 
far-reaching consequences, it does in fact represent a 
resolution of part of a case between real parties, which should 
also be borne in mind. The plaintiffs should be permitted to 
resume prosecution of their claims without the delay which 
would inevitably occur if this Court were to permit further 
briefing and argument in a case where the positions of the 
members of the Court have been set forth in great detail. The 
members of the Court have ably supported their respective 
positions in an exhaustive opinion. Any further questions 
presented by the Court's decision can be, and will be, resolved 
on a case by case basis as the need arises. This case, 
however, should simply be allowed to proceed to trial. 
POINT I. 
THERE IS NO NEED FOR FURTHER 
BRIEFING IN THIS ACTION 
Nothing constructive would be accomplished by delaying 
this action further to permit the defendants to brief the due 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
process question, as that issue is not dispositive of the 
action and is not the basis upon which the majority opinion 
ultimately rests. Each member of the majority indicated that 
they did not accept the notion that constitutional analysis 
under the State constitution should be bound by the rigid 
analytical framework employed in federal equal protection 
cases. Justice Stewart noted that this Court had previously 
articulated a differing standard of review under Art. I, § 24 
of the Utah Constitution when the challenged discrimination 
involved the impairment of a plaintiff's right to seek full 
damages for personal injury. See Maian v. Lewis, 693 P.2d 661 
(Utah 1984). In emphasizing that the standard for review 
should vary depending upon the nature of the right impaired by 
a discriminatory statute (and the degree to which it was 
impaired), Justice Stewart was in complete agreement with 
Justice Durham's opinion, which acknowledged the requirement 
that legislation impacting on the constitutionally protected 
rights of plaintiffs to seek full damages for injuries should 
be reviewed under a heightened standard involving a real and 
thoughtful examination of the legislative purpose and the 
relationship between the legislation and that purpose. 
Justice Zimmerman did not disagree. He simply joined 
Justice Durham in noting that in a case involving limitations 
-2-
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on the right to recover damages a due process balancing test, 
. as set forth in Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 717 P,2d 670 
(Utah 1985), was a more "straightforward" way for the Court to 
free itself from the analytical straightjacket developed under 
federal equal protection law. It is more "straightforward" 
because it focuses directly on the nature of the right being 
impaired and the manner of its impairment and bypasses analysis 
of the classification scheme designating who will and who will 
not be subject to the legislative abrogation of a recognized 
common law right. 
Contrary to the defendant's contention, this Court did 
not decide this case on the basis of a constitutional provision 
and an analytical standard which were not briefed by the 
parties. Plaintiffs have argued throughout this case that 
because their rights under Art. I, § 11 were implicated, a 
higher level of scrutiny was required in reviewing the 
statute. Each member of the majority agreed, with Justice 
Stewart finding that the heightened scrutiny was necessary 
because the statute discriminated in connection with a 
constitutional right, while Justices Durham and Zimmerman found 
the higher standard to be warranted because of the nature of 
right affected, without regard to whether it was impaired in a 
manner which separated the plaintiffs from others "similarly 
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situated." Justices Durham and Zimmerman both acknowledge that 
the standard of review employed by all the members of the 
majority is essentially identical, they merely differ with 
Justice Stewart concerning the need to find a discriminatory 
classification before undertaking the analysis. What can't be 
denied, however, is that if the statutory limitation on the 
right to recover full damages is itself unreasonable, then 
certainly the imposition of that unreasonable burden in a 
discriminatory manner cannot be constitutional. 
As there is no question that the majority of the Court 
is of the opinion that the damage limitations provisions in 
issue place an unreasonable burden on the constitutionally 
protected rights of a class of people who have been singled out 
for distinct legislative treatment, there is no reason for the 
Court to reconsider in this action which state constitutional 
provision may be the most appropriate vehicle for challenging a 
statute which impairs rights protected by Art. I, § 11. 
POINT II. 
DEFENDANTS HAD A FULL OPPORTUNITY TO 
MARSHALL ALL AVAILABLE EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT 
OF THE CHALLENGED STATUTORY SCHEME 
The defendants' attempt to characterize the Court's 
action, in adopting a standard of review which requires a 
demonstration of the reasonable relationship between a 
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statute's purpose and the means used to accomplish that 
purpose, as a fundamental change in the law which they had no 
reason to anticipate is disingenuous. All members of the Court 
acknowledged that, in both state and federal equal protection 
analysis, courts have frequently imposed a heightened standard 
of review, however characterized, when the challenged statute 
implicated significant, though nonfundamental, rights. In the 
trial court, the plaintiffs argued that either strict scrutiny 
or a heightened, realistic, level of review should apply. The 
defendants acknowledged the existence of authority supporting 
these standards of review but simply asserted they weren't 
appropriate in this case. They were in no way precluded from 
the presentation of any factual material or evidence which they 
believed may have tended to validate the statute by 
demonstrating its reasonableness. They chose, instead, to rely 
upon the argument that the statute should be analyzed under the 
minimal scrutiny of the rational basis test, relying upon the 
presumption of constitutionality. All members of this Court 
agreed that the State's burden to demonstrate the 
reasonableness of a statute's objective varies in relationship 
to the significance of the rights affected by the legislation. 
The defendant's refusal to acknowledge that such is the case is 
no justification for relieving them from the consequences of 
their own election. 
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POINT III. 
THERE IS NO BASIS FOR LIMITING THE 
APPLICATION OF THE COURT'S DECISION 
The arguments advanced for prospective application of 
the Court's ruling mischaracterize the Court's holding and 
totally ignore the effect such a decision would have on the 
constitutionally protected rights of the plaintiffs. This case 
did not overrule Frank v. State, 613 P.2d 517 (Utah 1980), 
because there was no challenge in that case to the 
constitutionality of the legislative attempt to grant tort 
immunity where none had existed at common law. Furthermore, 
the statute which has been invalidated in this case was amended 
more than four years ago and, therefore, no person who doesn't 
have a pending claim in litigation could possibly be affected 
by the Court's precise holding. In other words, to request 
that the opinion be given prospective effect (and not apply to 
the plaintiffs or others with pending claims arising under the 
old statute) is to request that the Court's ruling be given no 
effect whatsoever. 
The defendants' unsubstantiated assertion that they 
have relied upon the limitation in doing risk assessment is 
both without any evidentiary support and, to some extent, 
untrue. The Hospital did, during some periods when the statute 
-6-
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was in effect, purchase insurance to cover liability for losses 
commencing at an amount which greatly exceeded the statutory 
maximums. Purchase of this "stop loss" or "catastrophic" risk 
insurance was prudent and belies the claim that the state 
wasn't cognizant of any potential constitutional infirmity in a 
scheme whereby an historically nongovernmental function was 
simply "defined" to be governmental in direct contravention of 
the holding of this Court in Greenlaugh v. Payson City, 530 
P.2d 1217 (Utah 1975) . 
In exercising its discretion to deviate from the 
general rule that a decision is effective both prospectively 
and retrospectively (even a truly overruling decision), this 
Court must find that a substantial injustice would otherwise 
occur. See Maian v. Lewis, 693 P.2d 661, 676 (Utah 1984). The 
balance of the equities, however, is definitively in favor of 
recognizing the primacy of the plaintiffs' constitutional right 
to recover their damages free of an arbitrary and inadequate 
limit. For the same reason that the State's perceived fiscal 
interests cannot be constitutionally relied upon as a 
reasonable basis for imposing the statute's limit on 
plaintiffs' recovery, they cannot reasonably be interposed as a 
justification for denying to the plaintiffs the benefit of the 
very ruling which demonstrates the proper balance between these 
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competing interests. After a majority of the Court has held 
that the statutory damage limitation in question is an 
unreasonable response to the State1s asserted fiscal concerns, 
how can it be seriously argued that a substantial injustice 
will occur unless those very same state government 
considerations are allowed to prevail over the plaintiffs' 
constitutional rights? 
This is not a case where a private party relied upon a 
statute in shaping its decisions. In this case, the State 
enacted an unreasonable statute in an effort to insulate itself 
from full liability for activities of the type for which it had 
liability at common law. To the extent the State relied on its 
own efforts to impair the constitutionally protected rights of 
its citizens, its reliance was just as unreasonable as its 
efforts to preclude the plaintiffs from obtaining full redress 
for their injuries. 
CONCLUSION 
While there is obviously a division between members of 
the Court concerning the propriety of using substantive due 
process as a means of evaluating statutes which impair, but do 
not wholly eliminate, a right of action protected under Art. I, 
§ 11 of the Utah Constitution, the majority of the Court 
clearly believes that the statutes in issue in this case 
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unreasonably impair this right and are constitutionally 
infirm. Two members of the Court would reach this result using 
a due process analysis. However, it is implicit in their 
opinions that the same result would be mandated if an equal 
protection analysis was employed under Art. I, § 24. It would 
be pointless, therefore, to rehear this matter after briefing 
of an issue which is not essential to the Court's holding. 
Finally, the defendants* request to have the Court's 
ruling given only prospective effect is, in reality, a request 
for reconsideration of the merits of the case. This is so 
because the factors to be weighed in deciding if a substantial 
injustice would occur if the holding is applied to this case 
are essentially the same factors which shaped the outcome on 
the merits. As the Court has already determined that it is 
unreasonable to deprive the plaintiffs of their right to pursue 
full damages on the basis of a perceived financial benefit 
which would be provided to the State by doing so, the same 
result must obtain in deciding whether the plaintiffs1 rights 
to recover in this case should give way to the financial 
concerns of the State. To strike that balance in favor of the 
State would be every bit as unreasonable as the original 
imposition of the statutory damage limitation. The petition 
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for rehearing should be denied. 
DATED this o2#£_ day of June, 1989. 
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BV^ >7 /A^y^^L, A^ 
M. David Eckersley^--^^ 
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